Property investment with positive feedback?

By Daniek Zomer

This web-post applies the characteristics of Pierson's positive feedback processes on a small-scale-case, being property-investment i.e restoring a house. 

The real-estate market offers big profit opportunities. However, it is complicated for three reasons. First, „Unpredictability”: early events have a great impact and are random, and hence many outcomes are possible. Likewise, in the beginning of the investment, when the considerations of what you think will make the house more valuable result in the budget. For example, does the central-heating/floor need to be replaced? Should walls be removed? Moreover, there is asymmetrical information for you as an investor of why the house has been unused for such a long period. It might be the case that other investors know something about the house that discouraged them to invest in it, and that you will find out during the restoring process.

Secondly, „Inflexibility” and „Nonergodicity”, for instance, when you decided in the beginning to change the place of the stairs and later find out that it does not meet the „fire safety” standards that property valuers pursue. Hence, the further you are into the building process, the harder it becomes to shift from one path to another, as you already spent the money into new stairs. Furthermore, early decisions feedback into future choices for your budget.

Finally, „Potential path inefficiency” whereas in the long run, the outcome that becomes established may generate lower payoffs than a foregone alternative would have. If you would have kept the stairs, it would have saved costs or if you would not have spent the money on a new floor, you would have had the money to solve the water drainage issue that you found during the building process which would have resulted in a greater profit.

The Inefficient Imperial System

By Nynke de Vette

The British Imperial System was a system of units established upon order of George IV on June 17th 1824 and became effective on January 1st 1825. The system was implemented across the entire British Empire, but today all countries except the United States have converted to the metric system. The United States uses a slightly altered imperial system called the customary system.

Arguably, this is inefficient. The co-ordination effects argument as an economic driver of path dependency is reversed here. Usually the more people that use a system, the more profitable it is to use it also. By sticking to the imperial system, the United States kind of becomes an outsider. Furthermore, as with QWERTY and alternative keyboard layouts, it is questionable which of the 2 systems is more efficient. The metric system has certain logic to it its based on multiples of 10, whereas the imperial system units have archaic associations.

Thus, considering the inefficiency, what role do sequence and timing play in the system’s persistence?  

In answering this question, it is important to look at the history of measurement systems in the US. As part of the British Empire the Americans inherited the imperial system, also because the Americans themselves had established no alternative system. Meanwhile in France, after the French Revolution of 1789, the first attempt was made to unify the mix of thousands of traditional units of measure. This did not go unnoticed in the US, but when Thomas Jefferson presented a plan to Congress to adopt the metric system in 1790, Congress did not adopt it. Opponents considered the metric system as atheistic. The years after independence different states started developing their own standards. When the lack of uniformity started becoming problematic it was decided to establish a common system named customary units.

The timing and sequence of the introduction of the US customary units have exposed it to path dependency through the mechanism of positive feedback. The cost of switching is a cost-benefit analysis. However, it is interesting to note that with the rise of globalization (ie. international trade) the metric system has become more common in the United States also.

Nationalism and statemaking

By Abdel-Jaouad Ouarraki

Herbst argues that together with fiscal reforms, the creation of a national identity is central for the creation of states in Europe since the 17th century. He claims that “there has ... been no way of generating a national identity in Africa such as wars forged in Europe” and a couple of sentences later concludes that “the result is the anomie in most African countries today”.

A swift comparison between a couple of European and African countries, however, shows that today there is a strong feeling of nationalism in many African countries, even more, than in for example Spain and Sweden. Herbst further seems to assume that a greater sense of nationalism would make greater extraction possible when he says that “Africa, precisely because there is no ... challenge that causes them to respond as a nation. ...  African state's clumsy efforts at greater extraction are met by popular with-drawl rather than by a populace united around a common identity”. Taking Morocco as an example, I argue that this approach is a simplification of the situation in many African countries.

The symbol of Nationalism in current-day Morocco is the King Mohammed VI, his image can be found in every government building and in many private corporate buildings as well. The King is very powerful in Morocco, as he presides over the council of ministers and is able to veto ministerial appointments. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the Moroccan population is feasting in the streets when a tax increase is announced; rather, people aim their grievances towards the government parties. This is illustrated by the reaction of protesters from the 20 February movement during the Arab Spring simply putting that “the king is not the topic, he is not the issue for the 20 February movement”. Hence, a strong national identity is not a sufficient condition to enable greater state extraction.

Image source: worldvaluessurvey.org

Secession rather than Warfare as a Future for Africa

By Stuart Smith

Tilly goes into depth explaining how states can form through war and competition – a primarily exogenous reason for the creation of states. Although domestic institutions will ultimately decide how capable a state is to defend itself, the threat comes from outside the state’s institutions. But there are other, very different ways that states can come about. They can be revolutionised from the inside, or a previously whole state can become two. I believe the latter: division into smaller states, may offer a better explanation of how African states, without the threat of external violence, could experience major institutional evolution.

Shortly after South Sudan became an independent state, The Atlantic published an article noting that this could be a future for Africa: traditional borders but more division. Amazingly, the creation of South Sudan was decided through democracy and generally peaceful proceedings (although in 2013 yet another African civil war has broken out after the current president accused his deputy of plotting a coup d’état).

Most of the African states are huge, and on the whole are infamous for not well representing a significant minority within them. Is it any wonder that the 11th largest state in the world, a product of abuse and colonisalisation, is having problems when it was only created 60 years ago? Could (an ideally peaceful) independence campaign make development slightly more manageable? Some academics believe so. According to Ottaway, Herbst and Mills, division of large, weak states does offer a way out of institutional and economic stagnation.

Geographically it makes sense – even with Africa split up into double or even triple the number of states it does not come close to Europe. Compared to European countries this seems very feasible: the images below give a handy comparison: 

The Netherlands’ closest African country by area – Guinea Bissau.

The Netherlands compared to South Africa (it even makes Lesotho look big!)

Corruption and statemaking

By Thomas Giacoletto

In Bringing the State Back In, Charles Tilly explains how the need to wage war lead to the the creation of modern nation states in Europe. He explains that different states had to develop different bureaucracies (and therefore institutional frameworks) to be able to extract enough resources to have an effective army. More populated and richer states therefore had a larger pool of resources to extract from while other states had to create a “bulkier” bureaucracy and a “more extensive” fiscal apparatus (182).

Tilly does not only point at the amount of resources that are available for extraction, but also at how good states were at extracting. In order to grasp all the resources they could, states had to create an institutional framework that was bulky enough to tackle the issues of citizen’s unwillingness to pay and corruption (tax-collectors who would accept bribes for example). Indeed, states’ abilities to extract the resources they needed depended on their population’s willingness to pay. In order to ensure payment, they only had two options, namely: offering protection to their citizens, and setting up institutions that would disincentivise any refusal to contribute.

Tilly focuses on the former, however it is a strategy which is likely to allow free riding, and corruption. Indeed, people know that the state cannot afford not to provide protection to a part of the population because they did not pay their taxes (or because they bribed their local tax-collector as it would probably also be dangerous for the rest of the population which would then doubt their protection. The state therefore could not only rely on the protection it gives its population in order to extract the resources it needed. States were incentivised to create institutional frameworks that strengthened bureaucracy and prevented these type of practices had to be put in place to force the population to pay.

Maybe considering corruption as a gap in the institutional framework that has to be fixed would help countries strengthen their bureaucracies and improve their extraction possibilities.

Monopoly on violence in Mexico

By Lauren Wessel

Among social scientist, Tilly’s theory that “war makes states, and state maker war”, is very dominant in the state making theory in Europe. Tilly defines states as having a monopoly on violence. When one applies this theory outside Europe, it seems as if states do not always have a legitimate monopoly on violence. Can these states be seen as failed states?

In Latin America, there are organized crime groups that control specific territories. In these territories, they have the monopoly on violence, and can thus according to Tilly’s definition of a state be considered “states-within-states”. A lot of these groups are involved in drug trafficking, and their territories are appropriately called “narcostates". For instance, in Mexico, Culiacan, the Sinaloa Cartel is very active. It does not only have a monopoly on violence, but the influence of the cartel goes deep, as the area’s economy is dependent upon the income of the cartel. This is because cartels are able to influence state (and non-state) actors through intimidation or bribery. In some instances, the state has even made deals with cartels about drug-trafficking to ensure that the drug-related violence would not get out of control. Although these cartels do have some influence on a national level, the cartels are not able to exercise the same level of influence as they have locally, nationally. Therefore, Mexico is rather a state with failed cities, in which they do not have a monopoly on violence.

There are several ways to see whether Tilly’s definition of a state applies to Mexico. Either, the Mexican State is still in the state-building process, and has yet to reach its monopoly on violence; on the other hand, Mexico can be seen as a state with failed cities, in which it can only ensure a monopoly on violence indirectly by cooperating with other drug cartels. 

Hezbollah Made War and War Made Hezbollah

By Marleen Bornat

When people hear about the Lebanese organisation Hezbollah, they will most likely picture them as a terrorist organisation. Yet that portrayal fails to capture the many transformations the militant group has undergone since its formation in the 1980s; mainly from a resistance movement to a “state within a state” and an Islamic political party that is part of one of the dominating coalitions in the Lebanese Parliament (Davis 2007). In the following, I will apply Tilly’s (1985) theory of state making to Hezbollah to show that it is lacking a vital component of a state-building force, apart from the obvious lack of recognition by the international community.

According to Tilly (1985), there were four main processes to state formation in Europe. Among them is war making during which “states” eliminate their rivals outside of their own territory (ibid.). Although Hezbollah rarely engages in territory expanding activities, it led the struggle against Israel which strengthened its own regional basis (Davis 2007). Additionally, it possesses the unofficial monopoly of violence as it is much stronger than the Lebanese Armed Forces (ibid.).

Hezbollah also fulfils the protection element of state making. The organisation does not only defend the Lebanese people against outside forces but it also provides services that the state fails to care for, thus acting as a parallel authority. Additionally, it eliminates domestic enemies by punishing criminals according to Islamic law. The only state making element Hezbollah is really lacking is the ability to extract to realise the above-mentioned processes. According to Tilly (1985), European states had to extract resources for war efforts which required them to create bureaucratic institutions to secure regular income. Contrary to that, Hezbollah receives a lot of funding from its allies, today mainly from Iran (Davis 2007).

To summarise, although many sub-state groups or militant organisations have the strength to make war, build a state and protect, they often lack extractive institutions as they tend to rely on funding and plundering. This means that even though Hezbollah has in some parts established parallel state-like institutions that function better than the state-provided ones, as long as they are mainly a proxy for more powerful states, they will never be powerful enough to pose a real threat to the actual state.

War and State making; Child’s play?

By Lauke Stoel

While discussing Tilly’s main argument about war- and state making and their similarities to organised crime, the comparison with the mafia came up in class. Tilly argues that, much like the organised crime methods the mafia employs, the process of state making involves the ‘double-edged sword of protection’. His argument entails that, leading up to the emergence of nation-states, warlords created a credible threat of violence and sold protection against that very threat. With these ‘taxes’, wars were fought, protected territories were created and so the nation-state emerged. Yet, whereas in class, a link was made to the mafia, I associated it with the way children play on the playground and how this way of establishing hierarchy seems to be human nature.

Developmental psychologist Piaget, who researched the role of play in the development of children, found that as soon as there are no parents present who exercise their authority to settle children’s disputes, kids argue it out amongst each other, and find that rules of a game are malleable. This notion of malleable rules can explain the social dynamic of how one group of kids can make up the rules of a game they and their classmates play. Sometimes, they add or change rules if something does not go in their favour and often, the other children will play along. The credible threat for non-compliance to these new rules, however, is seldom violence, but social exclusion; not being allowed to play the game anymore. Like this, a social structure emerges, which it is more beneficial to be part of than to be excluded from, and it is based on an almost arbitrary establishment of authority. This illustrates how the emergence of our most common mode of governance, ironically, can be traced back to how children play.

Good Policies, Bad Politics

By Regis Hijnekamp

Banerjee and Duflo discuss the divergence between politics and policies.[1] They state that “the real problem in development” is ensuring good policies.[2] This, obviously, can be done through ensuring good politics, because “if the politics are right, good policies will eventually emerge.”[3] Yet, there is another route as well.

On February 20, 2016, Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni extended his 30-year rule with a next presidential term.[4] European and Commonwealth observers criticized the handling of the election.[5] There were “lengthy delays in the delivery of polling materials, outbreaks of violence, and a government shutdown of social media.”[6] The “lack of transparency and independence” at the Ugandan electoral commission undermined the polls too.[7] The atmosphere was “intimidating (…) for both voters and candidates.”[8]

Entering his fifth term, Museveni faces serious criticism. The president “is accused of presiding over corruption, personalizing the country’s institutions, and buying weapons to retain power.” [9] [10] It is feared that Museveni wants to uphold power – something that reminds Ugandans of the traumatizing Idi Amin dictatorship, Museveni’s predecessor.[11]

Yet, Banerjee and Duflo argue, “policies are not completely determined by politics. Good policies (sometimes) happen in bad political environments.” [12] Then, good policies might break through a vicious circle of bad politics and bad institutions. [13] So far, Museveni’s policies have resulted in “remarkable strides in the fight against HIV/Aids, an end to active conflict in most parts of the country, and economic growth fuelled by liberalization and direct foreign investment.” [14] Over the last 25 years, poverty rates have fallen from 56% to 19%. [15] Since his first election in 1996, Museveni has brought peace, security, and impressive economic growth. [16] These ‘good policies’ might drive out ‘bad politics,’ Banerjee and Duflo argue. [17] “Good policies can also help break the vicious cycle of low expectations: If the government starts to deliver, people will start taking politics more seriously and put pressure on the government to deliver more, rather than opting out or voting unthinkingly for their co-ethnics or taking up arms against the government.” [18] Only the future can reveal if Uganda can distance itself from ‘bad politics.’

Gerrymandering: small changes with big consequences

By Joost Koot

Sometimes, small things can have a big influence. Some academics that argue for this are Banerjee and Duflo. With randomised controlled trials they try to show that small changes in small institutions can have a positive impact. Gerrymandering is also a relatively small change within the institutions that make up democracy, of which the influence can be big. Gerrymandering however can have very negative consequences. Gerrymandering is the act of redrawing voting districts, to favour your own party. Redrawing district borders is not always bad. It is used to make up for changes in the population compared to when the borders were first drawn.

However redrawing districts can give political parties the ability to ‘cheat’ in elections by drawing the districts in a way that favours them. There are two main tactics for this. In the first one, you put as many of the opponent’s voters in as few districts as possible. This causes you to have the ability to have more districts for yourself. The second way of gerrymandering involves you cracking the districts. You spread out as many of your opponent’s voters over as many districts as possible to make sure they do not have a majority in any district. 

The relatively minor changes to the voting districts can have major consequences. Parties can be guaranteed to win the elections, before they even start campaigning depending on how loyal the voters are. Undermining the principles of democracy, gerrymandering could cause elections to be pointless. However, of course it only works if parties are able to predict who their voters are going to be. If everyone is an undecided voter, Gerrymandering becomes a lot more difficult

Brexit and institutional change: what will the EU and Britain do?

By Thomas Meijer

On the 27th of June Great Britain will decide whether it stays in the European Union in a referendum. This can have major effects on Britain and the EU’s economies, politics and international relations, but also on the institutions in both and their future development. You could argue that the EU and Britain have arrived at a critical juncture, as a number of options are open to a limited amount of actors, which in turn could determine on what path Britain and the EU are set.                                                                                                  

The Global Council describes five possible options that Britain has if it would exit the EU, in which case certain institutions, such as the rules that allow for a single market and the authority of the European Court of Justice, would radically change for Britain. Other options are currently being explored by David Cameron, who has struck a deal on a reform package that puts certain limits on the EU’s authority over Britain. The deal could be seen as a combination of layering, by giving every member state a ‘red-card’ which allows new ways of blocking EU legislation, and the establishment of an ‘emergency handbrake’ that allows Britain to delay paying benefits and cut existing child-benefits for migrants. It could also be seen as changing the level of enforcement, as Britain now no longer strives for an ‘ever closer union’.                       

If Britain were to exit, they would have to overcome the obstacles created by coordination problems and veto point both at once in the upcoming referendum. Asset specificity and positive feedback present other major obstacles in moving towards a Brexit, especially in the business sector, as Britain has access to the EU’s single market and all its trade agreements. Some suggest a Brexit might set the EU on a path of more integration, while others think EU-skeptical behavior will spread contagiously to other members. This could possibly create a tipping point against the EU.

Long-Term Horizons vs. Short Term Thinking: The Dutch Energy Agreement

By Ingeborg de Koningh

The Dutch Energy Agreement (Energieakkoord) was initiated in 2013 to “lay a basis for a widely supported, robust and future-proof energy- and climate policy and more sustainable economic growth.” To achieve these goals, the 2015 Progress Report notes a necessity for a long-term vision. Yet, Pierson (2004) states that institutional design may be limited exactly for reasons short-term horizons of those creating the institution.  

It is worthwhile noting that Trouw has recently called a “Code Orange” for the Energy Agreement, as two of the five main goals will not be met already with the current developments. One of them is the goal to generate 14 percent of all electricity through renewable energy by 2020.  The only way to achieve this objective would be through the construction of wind energy parks; yet plans meet much resistance and postponement. As a reason for this delay, Greenpeace’s Joris Thijssen points towards the VNO-NCW for blocking policies due to its representation of companies with invested interests in the current fossil energy provisions. Or in Pierson’s words, many of those involved have dedicated assets specific to those institutions perpetuating fossil fuel exploitation. As these assets cannot be reallocated to renewable energies, they incentivize the actors to remain at the status-quo, contributing to the resilience of the ‘non-green’ institutions..

So where the design of the Energy Agreement calls for a long-term vision, the conditions in which the institutions it wishes to change are vested seem very resilient due to the assets of the stakeholders the Agreement directs itself to. Here, those actors operate under a short-term vision instead, mostly concerned with the short-term impacts of transitioning to renewable energy. Ironically, whilst the Energy Agreement was constructed by actors with a long-term horizon, it is limited in its implementation by actors acting on short-term basis.

N.B picture from the 2015 Progress Report of the Dutch Energy Agreement. Bubbles say: “Energy policy requires a long term vision” and “...but do not forget the short term!”

Where’s the trigger? Using structural determinism to explain copy-cat shootings

By Stuart Smith

The chance of a mass shooting encouraging a copy-cat attack in the US is 20%-30% and lasts for 13 days. It cannot be known when or why they will attack but once an attack has taken place, the chance of another rises significantly. This is a phenomenon which best seems to be explained using a threshold model with structural determinism, as described by Gladwell.

In the case of a copy-cat attack, there need not be a gradual build-up of pressure over time. They may have all the motivation, weapons and mental instability but require something to tip them over the edge. These will be the people who are hovering just below the threshold, or beginning to move away from it. For the shooter there is no gradual positive feedback making a shooting more and more likely the longer time goes on. What is required is a critical juncture – a trigger. For copy-cat shooters, as the mainstream media love to find and make a deal out of, these are usually examples of long causes with short outcomes.

Once the first shooting takes place, a chain has been set in motion where we do not know when but know that another shooting is far more likely to occur.

What is important here is that the path of a person near the threshold would never necessarily lead to them shooting anyone- they could live their whole lives depressingly close, but never meeting. So their ‘path’ before a shooting was not subject to gradual pressures leading them to an attack. However, there is a possible way path dependent processes could become relevant after the shooting. Once the shooter’s mental state changes, they have a seed in their brain that this kind of action is possible and they may start planning or fantasising their own attack. I can see how negative and positive reinforcement could enter as a major mechanism here.

What is “Normal”? The Abusive Power of Unnoticed Institutional Change

By Katharina Bauer

In chapter 3, Pierson points to slow moving institutional changes that can only be captured once they exceed certain threshold values. In Pierson’s (2011) analysis, these threshold values are often treated as constant and with that considered to stay at one value over time.

However, threshold values in society can in themselves be subject to change. Deliberately slow introduction of institutional change can allow for adaption of threshold values to new circumstances. This can in turn ensure that institutional change remains unnoticed and is with that left unchallenged.

In this web-post, threshold values are understood as levels that trigger switches from perceptions of “normal” (same) to “not-normal” (different). According to Kahneman, two systems operate in the human mind, namely System 1 and System 2. System 1 is uncritical and intuitive, while System 2 involves more deliberate critical thinking. However, System 2 is only activated once System 1 perceives something as “not-normal”.  What is perceived as “normal” can adapt slowly over time and the threshold value of what is “not-normal” rise step by step. Consequentially, change can happen so subtly that System 2 is left un-activated, and it can in turn remain unquestioned.

Nowadays, democracies are facing a balancing act between the protection of people’s liberties and the insurance of public order. New information extractive technologies equip police forces with additional surveillance power and information collection is becoming increasingly pervasive. Used abusively, these new technologies offer powerful instruments for public supervision and have the potential to undermine current perceptions of democratic principles concerning privacy and autonomy.

If surveillance techniques are established rapidly, people oppose policies for fear of their liberties. However, police force and surveillance mechanisms can be increased just slow enough to remain unquestioned. Deliberately slow institutional change can thus become an effective means to avoid opposition.

Facebook algorithm: a virtual creation of Gladwell’s Tipping Point Theory

By Lauren Wessel

Aware of all the beauty the world has to offer, I often find myself sitting behind my laptop, scrolling through Facebook. Sometimes, my entire timeline seems to be in the grip of something. This can range from topics like the Paris attacks, to people hyping over this white and gold (or is it black and blue?) dress that kept the community busy for a solid 24hs. In his book “The Tipping Point”, Malcolm Gladwell explains that certain messages can be spread as epidemics, which are determined by “The Three Rules of Epidemics": The Law of the Few, The Stickiness Factor, and The Power of Context. It seems as if Facebook has exactly included these characteristics in its algorithm to ensure that a post goes viral.

Facebook, instead of randomly picking posts from your (probably way too extensive) friend list, has designed an algorithm that determines what and who is visible on your timeline. This is a very complex algorithm, but it comes down to these variables: the interest of the user in the creator, the performance of the post among other users, how popular the creator has been amongst other users, the type of post the user prefers, and the recency of the post.

The success a post is heavily dependent on the involvement of people with a particular and rare set of social gifts, which Malcolm describes as Law of the Few. Furthermore, the content of a post weighs heavily, which resembles the Stickiness Factor. If a post is usually interesting to the user, it will appear sooner. Furthermore, the Power of Context is important. It could be that a post has all it takes, but is overshadowed by other things that are posted at exact the same moment.

Facebook’s algorithm is complicated, and cannot be explained in one blog post. However, it should be clear that like Malcolm’s Tipping Point, popular posts do not go viral on accident: it is a combination of all these variables that allows Facebook’s algorithm to spread these posts like epidemics.

Kebab and Riots

By Daan Schouten

In Habit, Charles Duhigg recounts how an American major struggled with the many riots in the small Iraqi city of Kafu. More and more people would start assembling at the plaza as the day progressed. The crowd would grow restless and turn violent in the evening, at which point the Iraqi army had to intervene. After watching videotapes of the riots, the major identified the crucial role kebab vendors played: at dusk they would provide people with food. He suggested keeping them from the plaza. A week later, people assembled in the center of Kafu as they had done countless times before. However, around dusk hunger drew them home and no riots ever occurred again under the command of this major.

In Politics in Time, Pierson stresses the importance of timing in determining outcomes. Timing is important relative to the other factors that influence the outcome. In Kafu, only the actual presence of kebab vendors seems relevant. Yet here too, timing matters, but in a much simpler way: if vendors show up early, people will be hungry later on; if they arrive late, the square is already empty.

Also, the American major can evaluate his solution to the riots in much the same way Mahoney determines the importance of a strong military apparatus in Central America. Similar countries that varied in this aspect ended up with vastly different regime types. However, Mahoney needs to demonstrate that at some point, Guatemala and Costa Rica were almost identical in other relevant aspects that could also have a potential influence on the current regime type. The major’s claim that the presence or absence of kebab vendors can radically alter the outcome is much easier to support. He only needs to point out each riot is essentially a copy of the former one.

 Then, the absence of food vendors credibly preserves the peace at the plaza of Kafu.

Explaining the Keystone XL pipeline rejection: a Historical Institutionalist analysis.

By Stuart Smith

In November 2015, Barack Obama, rejected the proposal to build an extension to a pipeline which would facilitate tar sand oil exports from Canada to southern USA. The pipeline would offer little economic advantage for the US and would cause little environmental damage, yet the debate was intense and the decision historical – mainly due to its symbolic significance. This makes it an interesting case, as certain approaches of historical/social scientific analysis would struggle to explain the outcome.

I believe the approach of Steinmo (2008), Historical Institutionalism, is particularly useful here. It takes the institutional change at hand and places it into the historical context of the time. On the merits and cons of the proposal alone, Obama would most likely not even have become involved in the decision. However, some unusual factors which would only be revealed through historical context, can explain the outcome:

1. The environmental movement in the US had made it the posterchild of the climate change movement (even though this pipeline on its own would only add 0.01% to US emissions).
2. Obama and Joe Biden are nearing the end of their terms and would like to leave a legacy but also have less fear of using their full collective power on issues they consider important.
3. Obama was one month away from beginning climate change talks at the COP21 summit in Paris, and would be expected to lead on the international stage

The most important institution which was utilised by Obama was the presidential veto, which allowed him to reject the proposal based on his personal judgement. This means there is an element of self-interest which has to be considered, and HI allows for this. It also allows for informal, exogenous pressure on the president from the international community.

So a combination of having the institutional framework, the context of an upcoming summit, a winding-up presidency, and a desire to be remembered led to this decision. Many approaches would fail to produce a convincing narrative without accounting for such a diverse group of factors, demonstrating the usefulness of Steinmo's work.

Why did Rwanda escape slavery?

By Regis Hijnekamp

Nathan Nunn argues that the proportion of African slave trading had adverse effects on economic development (1). Nunn explains that “preexisting governance structures were generally replaced by small bands of slave raiders,” which weakened institutional structures and increased political instability, causing corruption of previously established legal structures (2).

Yet, Rwanda contrasts Nunn’s analysis with its low GDP per capita while having an enslavement export history of zero (3). Also, Nunn’s explanation that a region’s higher prosperity (measured by population density) led to higher slave export does not account for the difference: Rwanda’s population density in 1400 was single highest to that of the African countries while, again, the slave export was equal to zero (4).

Nunn confirms that, “to the known history of the slave trades, it was the location of demand that influenced the location of supply and not vice versa,” (5) and “being further from slave markets was good for growth.” (6) Yet, other landlocked African countries at roughly a similar distance to the coast as Rwanda, such as Zambia, Chad, and Burundi, witnessed more export of slaves (7).

An alternative explanation to the volume of enslavement in African societies may have been the strength of the bureaucracy or institutional structure weaponing itself against “political instability” (8) from “small bands of slave raiders.” (9) The societal characteristics in Rwanda may have been explanatory. In contrast to most African regions, Rwanda had already “a highly organized political structure” when it became colonized (10). The few reliable sources available “inform[ing] us about the history of a kingdom which by its end came to dominate a large territory and the lives of perhaps two million people.” (11) Court reports reveal information about kingdoms with powerful armies, about a bureaucracy with commanders in charge of their regiments, and the establishment of property rights over land (12). Yet, available data on the political structure of Rwanda is scarce and often unreliable.

The limitation of data available, combined with the negotiable credibility of most of this historic data, yet, cannot allow one to discard the pre-colonial period as a static homogeneity across the African continent in which villages and communities carried similar characteristics that become subordinate in a history of enslavement. Even more, one should grasp beyond generalizing explanations for long-term economic development. In considering the role of the bureaucratic and institutional strength of societies prone to enslavement, one might further develop coherent theories on development of African countries in a path dependency framework.

50PLUS

By Lauke Stoel

In our class, we established that history and therefore time matters and that path-dependence accounts for a large part of this. However, we can scrutinise this conception further by looking not only at how time matters, but also at the influence of the sequence in which events take place. In his second chapter, Pierson argues that there are two main themes that feature path-dependent sequences of development, namely filling up political space and developing social capacities. The case of the sudden success of a small, single-issue party in the Netherlands called the 50PLUS party is one that can be explained by combining aspects of both themes.

The Netherlands is coping with severe ageing of the population. With the proportion of elderly growing, it has become increasingly hard to provide for them and many find themselves in a particularly disadvantaged position. This process has been slowly but surely developing over the past couple of decades and has created a certain ideational social capacity within the voting population that remained unexploited.

The 50PLUS party originates from the ‘OokU’ founded in 2009 and changed its name in 2011. Until 2012, 50PLUS did not run for positions, but the first parliamentary elections after their change of name, which directly addresses this disadvantaged part of the population with their single-issue approach, they swooped in and now in fact occupy two seats in the First Chamber, one in the Second Chamber and are represented in all-but-one Province. Naturally, other parties had policies concerning the elderly as well, but because of the first-mover advantage the 50PLUS party made use of, alterations in other party’s elderly policies hardly affects the rank and file of 50PLUS. The sudden success of 50PLUS is thus a combination of the use of developed social capacity and the well-timed filling of political space.

The Early Bird Gets the Worm?

By Lotte Levelt

The timing of market entry of a company has great influence on its later success, or failure. A concept related to this is the so-called ‘first-mover advantage’. Its theory, described among others by Pierson as the ‘filling up of political space’, is widely supported. Interestingly however, the real world shows both first- and second-mover advantages, of which two will be illustrated, through Amazon.com.

First-mover advantages are the benefits a company gains (e.g. economic profits) through pioneering. According to Lieberman and Montgomery, these advantages stem from three main sources: technological leadership, pre-emption of assets and buyer switching costs.

Amazon.com (launched in 1995) appears to be a success story of ‘the early bird gets the worm’, being the first significant company to enter the online book market. It gained technological leadership through learning effects (dropping costs with cumulative output) and patents, its innovation to extend with other products proved successful. Other bookstores (e.g. Barnes and Noble) soon followed with their own web site, but did not manage to even approach Amazon.com’s success. Amazon.com’s pre-emption of assets, in this case the filling up of space on the internet was dominant. Finally, other bookstores had to invest in attracting consumers away from Amazon.com, which failed: Amazon.com is now partnered with Barnes and Noble.

However, there is another side to the story. Unbeknownst by many, Book Stacks Unlimited, or books.com, was launched already in 1991 as the first online seller of books. Therefore, the original significance or size of the company entering a market also has a large impact on its success, perhaps in spite of perfect timing. 

In conclusion, the timing and sequence of companies entering a market have great – but definitely not complete- influence on their later success. Meanwhile, it remains disputed if Amazon.com is an early bird, or a case of ‘the second mouse gets the cheese’.